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Over the past years, full-service carriers in Europe have deployed 
multi-hub-and-spoke systems by joining alliances to exploit network economies. The 
concentration of flights on a small group of airports leads to the emergence of 
‘fortress hubs’ and subsequently creates hub-to-hub markets in Europe reminiscent of 
the US aviation market. This paper explores the factors influencing the pricing 
behaviour of full-service carriers in European hub-to-hub markets. Drawing on a 
2009 dataset containing route and airfare information, we establish an econometric 
model to estimate the impact of route structure, alliances, and market concentration 
on the pricing of European full-service carriers in these markets. Three types of hubs 
(i.e., primary, secondary and tertiary hubs) are hereby identified to investigate the 
route structure within the hub-to-hub network. The stepwise regression results suggest 
that alliances on routes connecting two primary hubs, market share inequality and 
competition from low-cost carriers influence average airfares of full-service carriers 
in the European hub-to-hub markets. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Air transport deregulation in Europe has led to dramatic changes in the network 
configuration and business models of erstwhile national carriers. First, they have 
implemented or intensified the adoption of a hub-and-spoke network by concentrating 
traffic and flights around their hubs to accomplish network economies (Burghouwt 
and de Wit, 2005; Button, 2002; Caves et al., 1984; Janic and Reggiani, 2002). 
Second, sophisticated revenue management techniques have replaced the traditional 
regulated pricing mechanisms. Offering more differentiated products - such as 
in-flight entertainment, VIP waiting lounges, and other ‘frills’ - has gradually 
transformed national carriers into so-called ‘full-service carriers’ (FSCs) (Tretheway, 
2011). Third, the industry has been consolidated via cross-border mergers to remedy 
inefficient excess capacity (Brueckner and Pels, 2005), and through joining global 
alliances to strengthen their global presence (Benacchio, 2008; Doganis, 1994). In 
addition, the emergence of low-cost carriers (LCCs) has been a competitive challenge 
for FSCs due to the former carriers’ well-known cost advantages (Alderighi et al., 
2012). These changes force FSCs in Europe to constantly (re)examine their pricing 
strategies in order to achieve profitability in what have become (relatively more) 
liberalized markets. 
The literature examining the pricing strategies of FSCs in Europe is not as extensive 
as the one focused on the aviation market in the United States. Some of the exceptions 
include research on 1) flights from Nice Airport (France) to 9 European countries 
(Giaume and Guillou, 2004), 2) domestic routes and airport-pairs between the United 
Kingdom and 14 European countries (Piga and Bachis, 2007), and 3) city-pairs 
between Italy and the main destinations in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands 
(Alderighi et al., 2012). As a consequence, there has been to the best of our 
knowledge no research exclusively focused on how carriers determine airfares in the 
emerging European hub-to-hub (HH) markets, where both origin and destination are 
to some degree dominated by an FSC. 
An analysis of pricing in European HH markets is relevant for three reasons. First, 
hubs are typically located in Metropolitan Regions characterized by large populations, 
major levels of economic development, and an economic structure that is conducive 
to business travel (Dijkstra, 2009). Carriers operating HH routes can therefore not 
only expect to realize economies of density, but also capture more high-yield business 
travellers (Neal, 2011). Second, hubs assume different service levels in individual 
FSCs’ networks; i.e. the so-called ‘hub hierarchy’ that is also emerging in the US 
(Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005; Burghouwt and Hakfoort, 2001; Dennis, 2005; 
Frenken et al., 2004; Malighetti et al., 2009; Thompson, 2002). Burghouwt (2005), for 
instance, clusters airports into 1st tier, 2nd tier and 3rd tier hubs based on the number of 
weighted indirect connections in a carrier’s network, while Malighetti et al. (2009) 
distinguishes between ‘worldwide hubs’, ‘hubs’ and ‘secondary gates’ based on traffic 
volume, destination of connections, connectivity and topology of service. The ensuing 
‘hub hierarchy’ implies that the routes connecting different levels of hubs may vary in 
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their pricing: routes involving more dominant hubs can in principle be related with 
higher airfares because of ‘hub premiums’ (Vowles, 2006). Third, strategic alliances 
have complicated the route structure of HH networks. European FSCs have over time 
joined one of the three global alliances, thus leading to the development of explicit 
and implicit multi-hub-and-spoke networks: carriers extend their reach by interlinking 
each other’s networks (often via their hubs), so that the scope of their network grows 
without having to internally extend their own networks. Alliance carriers can, as a 
consequence, increase frequencies on their nonstop HH routes to facilitate customers, 
especially time-sensitive business travellers. Doganis (2006), for instance, found that 
the Lufthansa-SAS alliance increased daily departures between Frankfurt and 
Copenhagen for both carriers. As a consequence, carriers that do not ally on HH 
routes may lose competitive advantages comparing to allied carriers, so that the 
resulting market concentration can be expected to play an important role in explaining 
price discrimination (Borenstein, 1989; Piga and Bachis, 2007).  
The emerging ‘hub hierarchy’, the growing importance of alliances and their 
combined impact (i.e., a route connected by two hubs with different levels of hubness 
may also be an allied route) gives rise to an inherently complex European HH 
network. This raises questions on the major factors influencing the pricing strategies 
of FSCs serving the hub markets. The objective of this paper, therefore, is to 
investigate to what extent the emerging hub hierarchy, strategic alliances and the 
ensuing landscapes of market concentration influence the price-setting of FSCs in the 
European HH markets. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
reviews previous studies on how alliances and market structure determine airfares and 
yield in the US and European airline industry. Section 3 defines the European HH 
network, and introduces our data and method. Section 4 presents an analysis of the 
complex market structure of the European HH markets, and examines how route 
structure, alliances and market concentration influence the pricing strategies of FSCs. 
In section 5, we summarize the main implications of our analysis and outline some 
avenues for further research.  
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Hub dominance and airfares in HH markets 
 
Hub-and-spoke networks are associated with dominance of a hub airport by one or, 
occasionally, two carriers (Borenstein, 1992). If a carrier provides a large number of 
competitive indirect connections (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005) or connects large 
volumes of transfer passengers (Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005), then this carrier is said 
to ‘dominate’ its hub airport. The debate about the relationship between hub 
dominance and airfares rests on the question whether carriers can wield of market 
power by charging higher airfares on routes from/to their hubs than on other routes. 
There is no consensus as to whether a carrier’s pricing power at its hub airport can be 
conveyed to all routes involving the dominant airport, so that this relationship is 
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discussed at both the airport and the route level to obtain unbiased estimations.  
In US airline markets, researchers had found that the market power exercised by 
carriers has not been undermined since deregulation. Borenstein (1989) found that a 
carrier dominating at both the airport and the route level has the ability to charge 
higher fares, whereby the sources of this market power originate from 1) the dominant 
carriers’ ability to deter the entry of potential competitors by controlling airport 
facilities, as well as 2) the marketing devices such as frequent flyer programs (FFP). 
However, Evans and Kessides (1993) found that dominance at the airport level, but 
not the route level, can confer substantial market power upon the carrier when 
unexplained inter-route heterogeneity is considered. Aircraft can be switched 
relatively easily and costlessly between different routes making these routes naturally 
contestable, whereas airport facilities, product differentiation barriers arising from 
FFPs and other impediments make these harder to contest. More recently, researchers 
have offered new evidence for US markets and found that a carrier dominating at the 
route level can also charge higher fares (Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003; Stavins, 
2001).  
Marín (1995) was the first to address the issue in the European context and found that, 
in contrast to the US situation, European carriers tended to compete in terms of prices 
by exploiting cost advantages after liberalization. Captain and Sickles (1997) further 
found that the reasons why some ‘flag carriers’ cannot exploit such cost advantages is 
due to technically inefficient use of inputs and high labour wages rather than wielding 
market power between 1976 and 1990. However, it is clear that these studies deal 
with the earlier stages of European aviation deregulation. As the European aviation 
sector has gone through dramatic changes in the last decades, the impact of market 
dominance on airfares has also been altered by factors such as the proliferation of 
low-cost carriers (LCCs). Piga and Bachis (2007) concluded that the impact of market 
dominance on fares in European airline market depends on the type of carriers (i.e. 
FSCs versus LCCs). FSCs’ dominance at an airport plays a crucial role only for the 
fares associated with a particular set of booking days, i.e., the late booking ones, 
whereas LCCs dominating at an airport can always charge higher fares due to their 
ability to operate at lower costs. Dominance at the route level enables FSCs to 
exercise market power, but limits LCCs’ ability to charge higher fares only for late 
booking fares. They also argue that the limited size of many ‘natural monopoly’ routes 
contribute to the route dominance enjoyed by European carriers. 
 
2.2 Alliances and airfares in HH markets 
 
An alliance can increase the market share and market power of alliance carriers at 
their hubs, and reduce or eliminate competition on specific routes. However, when 
alliances or mergers significantly reduce competition in the relevant markets, the 
European Commission has imposed conditions such as giving up airport slots or route 
licenses to encourage the entry of new carriers (Doganis, 2006).The vast majority of 
dense intra-European routes are short-haul routes with less than two-and-a-half hours 
of flying time, implying that alternatives via transfer routes are not very attractive. 
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Joining in an alliance can therefore very effectively reduce competition on those 
routes by turning the previous duopoly into a monopoly (Doganis, 2006). However, 
the degree to which alliance partners (ab)use their strengthened dominance to charge 
higher fares on their hub-to-hub routes remains unclear. Oum et al. (2000) study 22 
international airlines for the 1986-95 period and find that partner airlines lowered 
prices by 1.3% after entering an alliance, and ascribe this result to the reduced cost 
because of efficiency or productivity gains. They particularly find that an airline with 
a longer average route length charged lower prices than that with a short average route 
length due to the competitive advantage of longer routes (e.g., reduced fuel 
consumption). At the same time, researchers have found that fares in markets served 
by an alliance were higher than those in non-alliance markets because of reduced 
competition, as in the SAS-Swissair alliance (Youssef and Hansen, 1994) and the Air 
France-KLM merger (Brueckner and Pels, 2005). Meanwhile, Wan et al. (2009) 
investigate the impact of airline alliances on airfares on transatlantic HH routes, and 
come to the conclusion that the net effect on airfares is uncertain as it depends on the 
ability of an alliance to coordinate fares.  
 
2.3 Market concentration and airfares in HH markets 
  
A carrier’s pricing strategy is driven not only by the internal carrier-specific 
considerations but also by the structure of external markets. As a market (i.e., 
individual airport-pair market) is comprised of carriers, passengers, and air travel 
products, the external market structure in which the carriers are operating depends 
upon four aspects: 1) the number of carriers and passengers, 2) ease of market entry, 
adaptation, and exit, 3) the extent of product differentiation or distinctiveness, and 4) 
the availability and cost of information (Holloway, 2008).  
The structure of the European airline markets can in practice be mainly categorized 
through three types, based on the number of carriers: monopoly (i.e., one carrier), 
duopoly (i.e., two carriers) and oligopoly (i.e., more than two carriers) (Alderighi et 
al., 2012). However, the number of carriers per se on a route is not the best measure of 
market structure and the competitive behaviour of carriers as it does not evaluate 
concentration (i.e., the market share distribution of carriers) (Giaume and Guillou, 
2004; Shepherd, 1999). The concept of concentration has been extensively applied to 
represent market structure in research focused on the relationship between market 
structure and pricing. Aiming to reflect the entire market share distribution of carriers 
in a single indicator, researchers frequently use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
to quantify market concentration (Hannan, 1997). 
The impact of route HHI on prices can be mixed and depends on the geographical 
areas. In the US airline markets, researchers have found that increases in route HHI 
raise prices to some degree as a few carriers in a concentrated market may collude 
more easily to charge higher prices (Borenstein, 1989; Chi and Koo, 2009; Evans and 
Kessides, 1993). However, a negative relationship between route HHI and prices also 
occurs when the dominant carrier enjoys technological advantages over its rivals and 
forces the other carriers to reduce prices to compete (Fischer and Kamerschen, 2003). 
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In the European airline markets, Piga and Bachis (2007) found that prices were raised 
by FSCs and LCCs as route HHI increased, but only for the prices associated with late 
booking days. Giaume and Guillou (2004) observed a negative relationship between 
route HHI and prices in the European markets and attributed it to the high inequality 
of market share leading to strong price competition between carriers. 
These findings suggest that the impact of changing market structure on fares for 
European markets will probably not be a copy of the US case, which calls for a 
systematic appraisal of its role in European aviation markets. 
 
3 Framework 
 
3.1 The European HH network 
 
A first step is to identify different types of carriers (i.e., FSCs, LCCs and regional 
carriers) in Europe. Researchers have long defined all the former ‘flag carriers’1 as 
the FSCs in Europe (Alderighi et al., 2012; Burghouwt et al., 2003). However, 
on-going deregulation has broadened the differences amongst these erstwhile flag 
carriers, as can be seen in the case of Aer Lingus’s transformation into a LCC (Barrett, 
2006; O' Connell and Williams, 2005; Wallace et al., 2006). FSCs are, therefore, 
defined as the former flag carriers in the EU that have joined one of the three global 
alliances (i.e., Star, Oneworld and SkyTeam). Meanwhile, this paper adopts 
Dobruszkes’ (2009) definition of LCCs as carriers for which prices on investigated 
routes are 0.10 Euro per km at most, or half the price of FSCs. We also incorporate 
regional carriers (REC) into our framework in order to examine the overall market 
structure. A REC is defined as a carrier which operates smaller aircraft (e.g., 20-100 
seats) and restrict its network to a geographically limited area (German Aerospace 
Center, 2008). The overview of carriers is represented in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Overview of carriers and alliance for FSCs 
Carrier 
Type 
Carrier Name 
FSCs Air France (SkyTeam), Alitalia (SkyTeam), Austrian (Star), British Airways (OneWorld), 
Brussels (Star), Finnair (OneWorld), Iberia (OneWorld), KLM (SkyTeam), Lufthansa 
(Star), SAS Scandinavian (Star), TAP Air Portugal (Star) 
LCCs Aer Lingus, Air Europa Lineas Aereas, EasyJet, Germanwings, Niki, Norwegian Air 
Shuttle, Spanair, Transavia.com, Vueling, Ryanair, Wind Jet 
RECs Adria Airways, Aigle Azur, Air Comet, Air Dolomiti, Air Berlin, Blue1, BMI british 
midland, Brit Air, Cimber Sterling, Eurowings, Lufthansa Cityline, Regional, SAS Norge, 
Tyrolean Airways 
Note: Alliance membership for FSCs is shown between parentheses. 
 
                                                             
1
 A national airline is one that is substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of that state in the EU 
(Doganis, 2001; Barrett, 2006) 
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The second step is to identify hubs in the networks of European FSCs. As the main 
purpose of a FSC’s hub is to concentrate flights through synchronized waves and 
reroute passengers, our working definition of hubs in the European airline market 
focuses on the number of competitive indirect connections as presented by Burghouwt 
and de Wit (2005). We define hubs as airports with more than 200 indirect 
connections per day and served by the FSCs identified in table 1. A classification 
scheme based on the number of indirect connections is applied to distinguish between 
‘primary hubs’ (>2500), ‘secondary hubs’ (501-2500) and ‘tertiary hubs’ (200-500). 
Table 2 presents an overview of the European FSCs’ hubs. This provides the scope of 
our study as the HH market is taken to consist of all connections where both origin 
and destination are hubs (see Figure 1). As a result of the presence of ‘hub hierarchy’, 
European HH network consists of six different types of routes, i.e., primary-primary 
(PP), primary-secondary (PS), primary-tertiary (PT), secondary-secondary (SS), 
secondary-tertiary (ST) and tertiary-tertiary (TT)2 routes. 
 
Table 2: Categorization of hubs for European FSCs 
Hub Airport Carrier Number of weighted indirect 
connections per day (2003) 
Primary (8)   
Charles de Gaulle (CDG) Air France 14005 
Frankfurt (FRA) Lufthansa 13616 
London Heathrow (LHR) British Airways 9439 
Amsterdam (AMS) KLM 8713 
Madrid (MAD) Iberia 6941 
Munich (MUC) Lufthansa 4184 
Copenhagen (CPH) SAS Scandinavian 2576 
Vienna (VIE) Austrian 2553 
Secondary (8)   
Rome Fiumicino (FCO) Alitalia 2384 
Barcelona (BCN) Iberia 2128 
Milan Malpensa (MXP) Alitalia 1946 
Oslo (OSL) SAS Scandinavian 1139 
London Gatwick (LGW) British Airways 979 
Helsinki (HEL) Finnair 957 
Lisbon (LIS) TAP Air Portugal 792 
Paris Orly (ORY) Air France 709 
Tertiary (2)   
Brussels (BRU) Brussels 452 
Dusseldorf (DUS) Lufthansa 214 
Source: Burghouwt (2005) 
 
                                                             
2
 Brussels-Dusseldorf is the only route termed as tertiary-tertiary route in this paper. However, it is excluded in our 
research as high-speed railway is more convenient and competitive than air transport on this short-haul route. 
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Figure 1 Non-stop connections between hubs of the European FSCs 
 
3.2 Data collection 
 
The main dataset used in this paper is collected through a research cooperation with 
Sabre Airline Solutions, and contains information drawn from Airport Data 
Intelligence (ADI) on actual bookings for different carriers. The Sabre ADI has at 
least one major advantage when analysing pricing and scheduling in the airline 
industry: it seeks to establish a complete dataset by adjusting and calibrating data 
from 1) global distribution systems (GDS), 2) travel agencies, 3) direct bookings, 
low-cost carriers, charter operations and 4) other non-IATA distribution channels. 
Sabre’s ADI database provides the required data for the proposed pricing analysis, 
including information at the route and carrier level of passenger numbers, revenue, 
cabin class and distance. It also indicates the intermediate stops when connecting 
services are available. The unit of observation is the non-stop connections between 
the 18 hubs in the overall network ‘produced’ by the 11 European FSCs given in 
Figure 1. An observed route is selected only if its monthly traffic volume is at least 
100 passengers, and a carrier is considered to serve the route only if its market share 
is at least 1%. In addition, the population of the hub cities is obtained from 
www.World-Gazetteer.com. The data used in this paper is for May 2009. 
 
3.3 Methods 
 
We establish an econometric model to examine the impact of route structure, alliances 
and market concentration on airfares in the European HH markets, all the while 
controlling for other variables such as population, regional effects, the traffic mix at 
the demand side, and distance at the cost side. This will be achieved by applying a 
stepwise regression method, which establishes the most effective set of independent 
variables according to their statistical contribution in explaining the variance of the 
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dependent variable. At each step a new variable with the largest t value is added, after 
which the significance of all the variables in the model is (re)tested. Variables with 
significance level above 0.10 are subsequently removed, after which the model is 
refitted. The procedure terminates when there is no more scope to add or remove 
variables. 
We draw on the decomposed Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI) to measure market 
concentration by accounting for unequal market shares among carriers. The 
decomposed HHI index is measured as: 
 
Decomposed	HHI = H1 + H2 = 	CV N⁄ + 1 N⁄     (1) 
 
Where: CV is the coefficient of variation of market shares and N is the number of 
carriers on a route. The first part of this equation (H1) is of particular importance as it 
represents the market share inequality of carriers on a route, while the second part (H2) 
describes the value of HHI when all the carriers have equal market share (Laderman, 
1995). 
Market concentration depends on the actual structure of individual hub airport-pair 
markets. Given the complex nature of market structure in the EU (partly because of 
the shorter distances between hubs and the alliance formation), we first perform a 
descriptive analysis of market structure before proceeding to the econometric 
analysis. 
 
4 Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Exploratory analysis of market structure in the European HH markets 
 
Market structure by route type 
 
As competition has not been homogeneous at the route level in Europe (Giaume and 
Guillou, 2004), it is necessary to analyze the market structure for each HH route 
separately. Table 3 shows that European HH markets exhibit three types of market 
structure in terms of the number and type of carriers: monopoly (10% of routes), 
duopoly (58% of routes) and oligopoly (32% of routes)3. Previous research done by 
Alderighi et al. (2012) has shown that the entry of LCCs has increased the 
competition of the European aviation market. They particularly distinguish between 
symmetric duopoly (two FSCs) and asymmetric duopoly (one FSC and one LCC), 
and also between oligopolistic routes with or without the presence of LCCs. Drawing 
on their categorization method, we find that 8 duopolistic routes and 26 oligopolistic 
routes have been entered by LCCs. These fundamental statistics indicate that 
European HH markets are 1) served by few carriers and characterized by high 
                                                             
3
 For instance, Barcelona-Frankfurt is a monopolistic route as Lufthansa is the only carrier serving this route at the 
time of data collection. Amsterdam-Charles de Gaulle is a duopolistic routes served by two carriers – Air France 
and KLM. The oligopoly markets have three or more carriers in services. Note that from an alliance perspective 
the CDG-AMS link will be monopolistic. 
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concentration, and 2) penetrated by LCCs.  
 
Table 3: An overview of market structure by route structure  
Monopolistic 
routes 
Duopolistic routes Oligopolistic routes 
 Total 
Two FSCs FSC&LCC FSC&REC Total WithLCC WithoutLCC Total 
PP 2 11 0 5 16 6 2 8 26 
PS 5 10 6 8 24 14 1 15 44 
PT 0 3 0 7 10 0 1 1 11 
SS 3 0 2 2 4 4 1 5 12 
ST 0 2 0 3 5 2 1 3 8 
Total 10 26 8 25 59 26 6 32 101 
 
The presence of LCCs and RECs indicates the possible inequality of market shares 
among carriers. We thus use the decomposed HHI to measure the market 
concentration when both asymmetries of market shares and the number of competitors 
on a route should be accounted for. 
 
The impact of alliances on airfares 
 
Alliances allow FSCs to form multi-hub-and-spoke networks and cooperate with 
carriers in the same alliance. 34 out of 101 routes in our study are connected by the 
same alliance’s hubs in our study (table 4). We categorize five types of routes by 
considering both the degree of hubness and alliances: PP*Alliance (e.g., FRA-CPH), 
PS*Alliance (e.g., FRA-OLS), PT*Alliance (e.g., FRA-BRU), SS*Alliance (e.g., 
OLS-LIS) and ST*Alliance (e.g., OLS-BRU). For instance, as Lufthansa, SAS 
Scandinavian, Brussels and TAP Air Portugal all belong to the Star alliance, 
FRA-CPH is thus a PP*Alliance route whereby FRA and CPH are the primary hubs of 
Lufthansa and SAS Scandinavian, respectively. The same approach was applied to the 
other route types. Based on the disaggregated market share of the carriers in the same 
alliance, five allied routes are monopolistic and 21 are duopolistic. When the market 
shares of the alliance carriers are aggregated, about 90% of alliance routes are 
monopolistic and duopolistic. This is particularly noticeable on PP, PS and ST alliance 
routes, suggesting that airfares may vary by route structure. 
 
Table 4: The effects of alliances on market structure by route type 
 Monopolistic  
routes 
Duopolistic routes Oligopolistic routes Total 
Before alliance     
PP*Alliance 2 4 2 8 
PS*Alliance 2 8 4 14 
PT*Alliance 0 5 1 6 
SS*Alliance 1 2 1 4 
ST*Alliance 0 2 0 2 
Total 5 21 8 34 
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After alliance     
PP*Alliance 6 2 0 8 
PS*Alliance 7 5 2 14 
PT*Alliance 2 4 0 6 
SS*Alliance 1 2 1 4 
ST*Alliance 2 0 0 2 
Total 18 13 3 34 
 
We also carried out an exploratory analysis to examine whether allied carriers 
exercise pricing power when their joint market share increases. Table 5 shows that the 
alliance carriers charge significant higher fares only on PP routes, but not on the other 
types of routes. There are two possible reasons. First, the raised market concentration 
on the other types of routes is offset by the economies of density, resulting in 
statistically insignificant impact on airfares. Second, allied carriers coordinate their 
pricing decisions on the main PP routes, implying that they primarily wield market 
power on PP routes. 
Table 5: The t-test results for average fares by route type 
Average fares N Mean $ Std.dev. Std.err. t-value 
PP route      
Same-alliance route  8  188.75  25.16  8.89  3.161  
(0.008)  Other routes 93  156.25  49.73  5.16  
Difference   32.49    10.28    
PS route      
Same-alliance route 14  176.93  67.29  17.98  1.13  
Other routes 87  155.91  45.18  4.84  (0.139)  
Difference   21.01    18.62    
PT route      
Same-alliance route 6  156.18  28.23  11.52  -0.22  
Other routes 95  158.99  50.07  5.14  (0.415)  
Difference   -2.81   12.62    
SS route      
Same-alliance route 4  127.47  57.67  28.84  -1.12  
Other routes 97  160.12  48.48  4.92  (0.171)  
Difference   -32.65    29.25    
ST route      
Same-alliance route 2  149.25  6.00  4.24  -1.50  
Other routes 99  159.02  49.43  4.97  (0.095)  
Difference   -9.77    6.53   
Note: H0: mean (diff) = 0; Ha: mean (diff) > 0; the significance level is shown 
between parentheses. 
 
The results in table 5 suggest that market concentration influences airfares, but 
previous research has shown that without taking mediating demand and cost variables 
into account such simple comparative approach can be misleading (Borenstein, 1989; 
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Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005). In the next subsection, we therefore establish an 
econometric model to assess the influence of hub hierarchies, alliances and 
concentration on airfares by controlling for these potentially intervening variables. 
 
4.2 The econometric model 
 
We establish an econometric model that explains the variability of earnings on 
non-stop HH routes in the intra-European air passenger markets. Earnings are 
measured through average one-way fares, which serve as the dependent variable in 
our model. The independent variables in the model combine demand, cost, route 
structure, and market structure variables. Continuous variables (i.e., population, 
business/economy traffic mix, distance and average fare) are transformed into their 
natural logarithms to reduce the impact of outlying observations and facilitate the 
interpretation of the coefficients as elasticities. The empirical pricing model for the 
HH network is specified as follows: 
 
LnAVGFARE = β + β LnPopulation + βRegional	Effects + β)LnBusiness
+ β+LnDistance + β,PP ∗ AllianceRoutes
+ β.PS ∗ AllianceRoutes + β0PT ∗ AllianceRoutes
+ β2SS ∗ AllianceRoutes + β3ST ∗ AllianceRoutes
+ β OneStop + β  H1 + β H2 + β )	LCCs 
                                                                     
(2) 
Where: β is the intercept and β5 are the estimated coefficients for the independent 
variables. AVGFARE is the average one-way fare charged by European FSCs on a 
route. 
 
Demand Variables 
 
Population is the average population of cities where the hub airports locate, indicating 
the potential market size of a given route. The impact of population on airfares can be 
mixed. On the one hand, larger population imply that more people will buy air tickets 
to travel, thereby increasing prices. On the other hand, higher population enables 
carriers to reduce prices by using larger and more cost efficient aircraft (Wan et al., 
2009). The estimated influence of population cannot be predetermined. 
The regional effects variable is designed to control the unobserved regional effects in 
nature, for instance, warm weather (Morrison, 2001) or the coastal mass tourism belt 
in Southern Europe (Bramwell, 2004). Specifically, Wan et al. (2009) defined airports 
locating in “European countries on the Mediterranean Sea coast and Portugal” as 
vacation destinations. We, therefore, control routes whereby either of the two 
endpoints is located in Barcelona or Lisbon to account for regional effects. A negative 
relationship between regional effects and airfares is expected. 
BUSINESS (i.e. a traffic mix continuous variable) is measured as the proportion of 
passengers travelling for business on a HH route. We aggregated four types of tickets 
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(i.e., first, business, discount business, and premium coach) together as ‘business’ 
passengers because carriers have largely blurred the distinction among these 
categories of premium tickets (Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005). Morrison (2001) 
applied this variable to reflect the adoption of yield management techniques by 
airlines (i.e., charging business travelers higher fares than leisure travelers) and found 
that fares are 28 % higher on routes with 75% business travelers than comparable 
routes with 25% business travelers. The US Department of Transportation (2001) also 
concluded that high fares in hub markets can be explained by passenger mix when 
routes are lack of price competition. HH markets have a large proportion of demand 
coming from business travellers with a relatively high ‘willingness-to-pay’, making 
the demand curves for these markets steeper than is the case in respect of more 
price-elastic markets (Holloway, 2008). In other words, the price increase in HH 
markets may theoretically lead to a relatively small demand decline. The expected 
sign for business traffic indicator is thus positive. 
 
Cost Variable 
 
Distance is the non-stop distance (measured in miles) between two hubs. As distance 
increases, average fares can be expected to rise since carriers’ operating costs with 
regard to fuel, in-flight service and wages will increase (Borenstein, 1989; Windle and 
Dresner, 1995; Vowles, 2006). The expected sign for DISTANCE is positive. 
 
Route Structure Variables 
 
In order to study the interactive effect of alliances and route structure on airfares, we 
establish five variables based on the exploratory analysis above.  
The PP ∗ Alliance	Routes  dummy variable represents routes connected by two 
primary hubs served by carriers within the same alliance. As carriers operating on this 
type of routes may exercise certain pricing power4, the expected sign of this variable 
is positive. PS *Alliance Routes, PT *Alliance Routes, SS *Alliance Routes and ST 
*Alliances Routes are four dummy variables detecting the effects of alliance carriers 
serving PS, PT, SS and ST routes, respectively. As the pricing power may be offset by 
the increased traffic and economies of density on those types of routes, the expected 
signs cannot be predetermined. 
The one-stop dummy variable represents routes whereby one-stop flights are also 
available. We consider a HH route with more than 1000 one-stop passengers on both 
directions in May, 2009 as a competitive one-stop alternative. The influence of 
providing indirect service on airfares can be complicated. On the one hand, it may 
reflect carriers’ entry strategy into high-yield routes whereby both endpoints are 
dominated by incumbent carriers and have a positive relationship with airfares. This 
requires the entry carriers to develop strong and competitive hubs capable of diverting 
passengers. On the other hand, a central hub enables its dominant carriers to provide 
                                                             
4
 We use dummy variables instead of market share of the leading carrier to define route dominance as it 
explicitly examines the relationship between route structure resulting from hub hierarchies and pricing. 
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competitive indirect flights on long-haul HH routes with strong directionality (i.e., 
North-South or South-East), and thus reduce the prices. In addition, the narrower 
European market and reduced use of hub-and-spoke networks may make ‘hubbing’ 
insignificant on airfares (Giaume and Guillou, 2004). The expected sign of this 
variable is uncertain. 
 
Market Structure Variables 
 
H1 and H2 are the two components of the decomposed HHI index. As more than half 
of the European HH markets are routes where a large FSC competes with a small 
LCC or REC (table 3), the market share distribution of those carriers is highly 
unequal. The smaller carrier is likely to reduce the price to maintain its presence, 
leading to a strong price competition between carriers (Giaume and Guillou, 2004). 
The expected sign of H1 is, therefore, expected to be negative. In a market 
characterized by perfect competition, higher market concentration due to a smaller 
number of carriers may increase the airfares on a route. Given that European HH 
markets appear to be imperfectly competitive, H2 may have insignificant impact on 
airfares.  
The LCC dummy variable examines the impact of the presence of LCCs. LCCs are 
taken to be present in a market when they collectively have a market share larger than 
1% of passengers in a market (Ito and Lee, 2003; Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005; 
Windle and Dresner, 1995). The expected sign of this variable is negative. 
 
4.3 Discussion of results 
 
Stepwise regression is applied to find the subset of independent variables that best 
predict the airfare variation in the overall European HH markets. Table 6 presents the 
summary statistics for the variables. 
 
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of variables 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Average Fares ($) 53.700  371.950  158.827  48.959  
Population (thousands) 581  5601  1985  1343  
Regional Effects 0.000 1.000 0.240  0.428  
Percentage Business (%) 1.700  59.130  19.564  14.742  
Distance (miles) 186 1834 683.525  341.938  
PP*Alliance 0.000 1.000 0.080  0.271  
PS*Alliance 0.000 1.000 0.140  0.347  
PT*Alliance 0.000 1.000 0.060  0.238  
SS*Alliance 0.000 1.000 0.040  0.196  
ST*Alliance 0.000 1.000 0.020  0.140  
Onestop 0.000 1.000 0.120  0.325  
Market Share Inequality (H1) 0.000 0.665  0.082  0.108  
Equal Market Share (H2) 0.167  1.000 0.469  0.202  
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LCCs 0.000 1.000 0.330  0.471  
# obs 101 
 
Table 7 summarize the regression results, whereby 8 out of 13 independent variables 
are found to be statistically significant, collectively explaining 51.1% of the 
price-setting of FSCs in the European HH markets.  
 
Table 7 Coefficients for the stepwise regression model 
 Unstandardized Coefficients B Standardized Coefficients Beta5 
(Constant) 5.031*** (0.725)  
LnPopulation -0.103*** (0.039) -0.202 
RegionalEffects -0.246*** (0.060) -0.344 
LnBusiness 0.070* (0.038) 0.180 
LnDistance 0.217*** (0.059) 0.368 
PP *Alliance 0.232*** (0.086) 0.206 
Onestop 0.172** (0.074) 0.183 
H1 -0.626*** (0.220) -0.220 
LCCs -0.107** (0.052) -0.164 
R Square 0.511  
Note: Standard errors are reported between parentheses. 
     *, **, *** Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Demand Variables 
 
The negative coefficient of population indicates that carriers operating on the 
European HH routes can fulfil economies of scale by using larger and more cost 
efficient aircraft. As the number of average population increases 1% in the European 
HH markets, the prices are predicted to fall by 0.1%6. Routes centred on what are 
identified as predominant ‘vacation destinations’ are negatively related to airfares and 
are about 27.9% lower than the other routes. We also find that the ‘traffic mix’ is 
indeed a factor in the price setting of European FSCs in their HH markets. The 
estimates show that an increase of 10% in the proportion of business passengers leads 
to an increase of about 0.7% in fares charged by European FSCs. The relative small 
coefficient reflects the reality that the travel behaviours of business passengers is 
changing and more sensitive to fare (Gillen and Morrison, 2005). In the European 
airline markets, researchers have found that business travellers working for small 
companies are more willing to trade in-flight service, frequency and FFP points for 
lower fares than those working for larger companies (Mason, 2001), suggesting a shift 
of pricing strategies for FSCs. 
                                                             
5
 Standardized coefficients are applied to estimate which of the independent variables has a greater effect on the 
dependent variable when the variables are measured in different units of measurement. 
6
 When both independent and dependent variables are natural logarithmic transformed, back-transformation is 
compulsory to accurately interpret the results. The equation is 61 + 1%8 − 1: ∗ 100%. For all the dummy 
variables, the equation applied to interpret the results is 6e8 − 1: ∗ 100%. 
15 
 
 
Cost Variable 
 
Distance is positively related to the airfares as shorter routes are cheaper to run (in 
absolute terms) than longer ones. An increase of 1% in the route’s length leads to an 
increase of about 0.22% in fares. The elasticity of less than one shows, however, that 
the airline’s cost of carrying a passenger does decrease in relative terms with the 
distance of his/her trip. 
 
Route Structure Variables 
 
Prices are found to be about 26.1% higher on primary-primary routes operated by 
carriers within the same alliance than the other routes, indicating that alliance carriers 
wield some pricing power due to reduced market competition. The insignificant 
influence of the other types of alliance routes on airfares can be explained by the less 
intense use of hub-and-spoke network in intra-European airline markets compared to 
the US, corroborating the findings of Giaume and Guillou (2004). For instance, Paris 
Orly (ORY) and Brussels (BRU) are de facto specialized hinterlands for African 
markets rather than intra-European hubs (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005). On the other 
hand, smaller airports have become more important in carrying intra-European traffic. 
Piga and Bachis (2007) found that lower fares are charged by LCCs on the routes 
from their hubs such as Stansted for Ryanair due to cost advantages. 
In addition, the one-stop variable has a positive relationship with airfares, indicating 
that carriers choose high-yield routes to enter by providing one-stop flights. Overall, 
prices on HH routes with the coexistence of nonstop and one-stop services are 18.8% 
higher than for the other routes. Lufthansa at Frankfurt and Swiss at Zurich 
contributed most of transfer traffic on those routes due to their strong hub operations. 
As European FSCs gradually intensify the configuration of their hub-and-spoke 
network with less waiting time and lower routing factor, indirect connections can 
become more attractive in intra-European markets (Burghouwt and de Wit, 2005). 
 
Market Structure Variables 
 
The market concentration measured as the market share inequality (H1) has a negative 
impact on fares, which contrasts with the US experience in which concentration leads 
to higher airfares. Assuming that there are two routes (i.e., route 1 and route 2) 
whereby each of them is served by three carriers. The market shares of the carriers for 
route 1 are 0.5, 0.25 and 0.25, whereas those for route 2 are 0.4, 0.3 and 0.3, 
respectively. In other words, the distribution of market shares among carriers on route 
1 is more unequal than that on route 2. Based on equation 1, the value of H1 for route 
1 (i.e., 0.063) is higher than that for route 2 (i.e., 0.01) by 0.053, implying that the 
average fares charged by FSCs on route1 is 3% (i.e., 0.053 multiplied by the 
coefficient of H1 in table 7) lower than that on route 2. This finding also supports the 
exploratory analysis of the market structure of European HH markets whereby 64% of 
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routes served by FSCs confront competition from at least one LCC or regional carrier. 
The large difference of market share forces the only carrier to reduce their prices to 
compete with FSCs.  
The presence of LCCs can largely influence FSCs’ pricing decisions in the European 
HH markets. Their head-to-head competition with FSCs drives prices down by 11.3%.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of this paper was to explore factors influencing the pricing of the 
European full-service carriers in the specific hub-to-hub markets. We find that four 
factors (i.e., route type, market share inequality, competition from low-cost carriers, 
and providing competitive one-stop alternative routings) contribute to explain the 
pricing in Europe’s HH markets. As a consequence, we conclude that through 
strategic alliances, FSCs in Europe do charge higher fares on the routes connected by 
their primary hubs. However this finding only holds for connections between primary 
hubs, which may be related to the fact that – in contrast to the US market that has a 
longer history of deregulation and straddles a larger geographic area – an extensive 
multi-hub-and-spoke network does not yet exist (at least in terms of its potential 
pricing consequences).  
Our finding that the market share inequality is negatively related with airfares 
corroborates the results obtained by Giaume and Guillou (2004). The specific 
characteristics of the European HH markets suggest that more new entries should be 
encouraged to compete with the incumbent FSCs. The low-cost carriers function as a 
main force for driving prices down in the HH markets, and will likely continue to 
influence the more extensive markets due to the enlargement of the European Union 
(i.e. the so-called ‘new Europe, new low-cost air services’ discussed by Dobruszkes 
(2009)).  
Finally, even though nonstop HH routes generally have high barriers to enter, we find 
that carriers, such as Lufthansa and Swiss, who have established strong hubs tend to 
enter some routes with high profitability by providing one-stop routings (i.e., the 
positive relationship between one-stop variable and prices). However, it is unclear 
how these carriers attract sufficient passengers to order these one-stop tickets along 
with sacrificing the longer travel time, given the short distances between airport-pairs 
in Europe. Future research may therefore focus on examining how FSCs in Europe set 
pricing strategies on one-stop connecting flights by considering factors, such as, travel 
time, the competition from nonstop flights (Lijesen et al., 2004) and passengers’ 
willingness to pay (Garrow et al., 2007).  
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